Vault content encryption
After unlock, Vault opens each item and attachment to verify its AES-GCM authentication tag, reporting successful and failed counts.
AES-256-GCM · authenticated ciphertextSecurity, verified in the app
Security is not a promise.
It should have a state, a time, and a failure result.
Vault does not ask you to trust the phrase “AES-256.” The app derives verified, pending, or failed states from on-device and CloudKit checks. No software can promise absolute security; this page makes the protection and its limits explicit.
Your important recordsAccounts · files · identity · private records
→On your iPhoneAES-256-GCM authenticated encryption
→Synced to iCloudCiphertext, not plaintext
Four real checks
The four states shown in Vault
come from actual checks.
They are not hard-coded green checks. A check the app cannot complete remains pending; a detected error becomes failed. A newer failure supersedes an older success.
Recovery key held by the user
This becomes verified only when a real CloudKit sync receipt confirms that the recovery phrase was not written to the cloud.
recoveryKeyNotStoredInCloud == trueDaily access protection
Vault checks password protection configuration and reports current Face ID authorization plus the last successful verification time.
password protection + current Face IDCloudKit ciphertext read-back
New writes are read back through their known Record IDs. The receipt reports verified remote item and attachment counts.
direct record read-back · receipt timestampVerifiedCurrent successful evidence exists
PendingThe app still lacks evidence
FailedA tag, configuration, or read-back error exists
THE THREE-SECOND MODEL
Your data can go to the cloud.
Your key does not.
Cloud threat boundary
Someone obtaining cloud data
does not automatically reveal plaintext.
CloudKit ciphertext only
The attacker still lacks decryption ability. Record existence and necessary technical metadata may remain visible.
The 12 words only
Without matching ciphertext, the phrase is not your file content. It is still a critical compromise of the final key.
Both together: unsafe
The complete phrase and matching ciphertext can enable decryption. Vault does not hide this boundary behind “absolute security.”
The real key
One physical safe key becomes
four distinct roles.
Final recovery key
Rebuilds decryption access after device loss or replacement. Keep it complete and offline.
Daily lock
Protects routine entry. Password recovery still needs the phrase and available ciphertext.
Local authorization
Conveniently unlocks a configured device; it is not the cross-device recovery key.
Cloud record access
Retrieves iCloud/CloudKit data. The account itself is not the content decryption key.
Recovery ceremony
Move the 12 words off the phone
and into the physical world.
Write and verify
Copy all 12 words in order and complete the random-position verification.
Keep offline, consider two locations
Use a physical safe or another controlled place; account for fire, water, and legacy access.
Do not colocate key and ciphertext
Avoid screenshots, photos, email, cloud notes, or storing Vault’s phrase inside Vault itself.
Forgotten password
What is the recovery path?
Retrieve ciphertext
Obtain vault records from your iCloud/CloudKit context.
Enter all 12 words
Order and spelling must be correct.
Rebuild decryption access
Verify and decrypt records on the new device.
Set new daily protection
Configure a password and current Face ID again.
If the phrase and all authorized devices are lost, the developer cannot bypass encryption to recover the content. That is the consequence of user-held final control.
What belongs inside
What should you store?
Accounts, identity material, legal files, family records, digital-asset instructions, recovery keys for other services, private files, images, audio, and video. Vault does not transact, replace a hardware wallet, or provide browser autofill like a dedicated password manager.
See the complete suitable / unsuitable list →Honest limits
A credible threat model includes failure.
| Event | Result | Condition and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Lost iPhone | Daily access remains protected | Password, Face ID, and device security must remain effective |
| Leaked iCloud ciphertext | Still authenticated ciphertext | The attacker did not also obtain the phrase or an authorized device |
| Developer attempts access | Cannot decrypt without the phrase | Sync services still process necessary metadata |
| Destroyed device | Recoverable | CloudKit ciphertext is available and the phrase is correct |
| Phrase and all devices lost | Not recoverable | The developer cannot bypass encryption |
| Ciphertext and phrase stolen | Unsafe | The final key is compromised |
This page describes the current public implementation and verification method. It is not an independent security audit and does not claim absolute safety. Last updated September 14, 2026.
Vault for iPhone
Important things deserve a real safe.
US$4.99 one-time paid download in the U.S.; local App Store pricing varies.
View on the App Store